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COMMODO CA VEO:
"LENDER BEWARE"-AN ANALYSIS OF LENDER LIABILITY FOR
CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS UNDER THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY

1.

INTRODUCTION

The recent holding of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Kirkman v. Parex,
Inc.' outlines a two-part test for courts to use in evaluating potential lender liability
under the implied warranty of habitability.2 In its disagreement with the lower
courts' determinations that First Union was not subject to implied warranty liability
because it was a "mere lender," the court held that there remained an issue of
material fact as to whether the lender was "substantially involved" in the
completion of the Kirkmans' home. An affirmative finding of substantial
involvement denotes that the lender impliedly warranted the home.4 Following a
finding of substantial involvement, the second inquiry outlined by the court is
whether the lender effectively disclaimed the implied warranty of habitability.5
The court's decision in Kirkman deviates from the techniques adopted by
courts in other jurisdictions that have considered the issue of lender liability.6 The
decision, however, is sound as a matter of policy because it protects the important
social interest of caveat venditor,thus affording the buyer of a new home protection
against latent defects. Such protection is a significant issue in South Carolina as
there has been an increase in the number of building permits granted for new
privately-owned housing units within the state,7 demonstrating the continued
intention of builders and residents to construct new homes in the state.' With the

1. 369 S.C. 477, 632 S.E.2d 854 (2006).
2. Id. at 486, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
3. Id. at 483-85, 632 S.E.2d at 857-58.
4. See id. at 486, 632 S.E.2d at 858 (holding that lenders meeting the first prong of substantial
involvement but failing to effectively disclaim the implied warranty are subject to judicial determination
of whether the warranty was breached).
5. See id at 486, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
6. See generally Jeffrey T. Walter, Annotation, FinancingAgency'sLiabilityto Purchaserof New
Home or Structurefor Consequencesof ConstructionDefects, 20 A.L.R.5th 499, 507 09 (1994) (stating
that lender liability "has not [been] met with widespread judicial acceptance" and presenting scenarios
in which courts have denied and upheld lender liability to purchasers not in privity with the lender).
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, TABLE 933: NEW PRIVATELYOWNED HOUSING UNITS AUTHORIZED BY STATE: 2000 AND 2006, http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/tables/08s0933.pdf (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONSTRUCTION REPORTS, NEW RESIDENTIAL
CONSTRUCTION, http://www.census.gov/const/www/newresconstindex.html).
8. The residential housing market in South Carolina began to decline in 2006. MOORE SCH. OF
BuS., UNIV. OF S.C., SOUTH CAROLINA RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION, http://moorecms.graysail.com/
moore/research/Publications/Indicators/data/resc.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). Nonetheless, lender
liability for breach of warranty is likely to remain significant. Indeed, if some builders face financial
difficulty or even bankruptcy, banks may face even more claims.
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average purchase price of a home being $160,000,' purchasers likely will turn to
lenders for financing options; therefore, the recent increase in the construction of
new homes has created the potential for lender liability and has magnified the
significant impact Kirkman could have on lenders.
Lenders likely will face problems arising from this decision, as it leaves them
uncertain in determining what constitutes substantial involvement'0 and how they
will meet the stringent burden of proof in showing that the contracting parties
"specifically bargained for" a disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability."
Should this uncertainty create substantial problems for lenders, this Note proposes
an alternative whereby South Carolina could enact legislation requiring a lender to
offer insurance covering latent defects if the lender disclaims the implied warranty
of habitability.
Part I1 of this Note discusses the development of the implied warranty of
habitability during the South Carolina Supreme Court's movement from applying
caveat emptor to applying caveatvenditor in the sale of new homes. Additionally,
this Note compares South Carolina lender liability cases with those in other
jurisdictions that impose tort and contract liability upon lenders who are in essence
"joint venturers." Part ITT outlines the facts of the Kirkman decision and discusses
the two requirements a court will use in determining lender liability-substantial
involvement and a three-part test for an effective disclaimer. 12 Part IV discusses the
uncertainty lenders will face in attempting to discern conduct constituting
substantial involvement. This uncertainty results from the lack of caselaw
illustrating situations when this standard is met. Part V illustrates that this
uncertainty of substantial involvement joins with a lack of direction given to
lenders in determining how to prove a lender and seller specifically bargained for
a disclaimer. While it appears a lender could fulfill the "conspicuous" and "known
to buyer" requirements through a standard form with a signature requirement, there
is little indication of what factors illustrate a specifically-bargained-for disclaimer
other than a reduction in the price of the new home. 3 Part VI proposes the
enactment of a statute that would ensure protection of buyers from latent defects by
requiring lenders to offer insurance if they disclaim the implied warranty of
habitability. The acquisition of such insurance by lenders or their developers aligns
with the sound policy implications of Kirkman by ensuring the buyer receives the
benefit of the bargain from a party better situated to protect against latent defects.
Additionally, such an alternative would provide a better option for lenders and

9.
S.C. REALTORS, 2007 MLS STATS-SEPTEMBER, http://www.screaltors.com/mls/
SC MLS Stats Q307.pdf (stating that the median price of residential homes, condos, and villas sold
in South Carolina during the first three-quarters of 2007 was approximately $160,000); see also U.S.
CENSUS

BUREAU,

STATES

SPECIFIED

STATE

AND

OWNER-

METROPOLITAN

AND

AREA

RENTER-OCCUPIED

DATA

UNITS
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2006,

TABLE
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AND
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http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/smadb/smadb-O6tablea.pdf(reporting that the median value of
one-family homes in South Carolina was approximately $121,000 in 2003).
10. Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 483, 632 S.E.2d at 857 (quoting Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg.
Co., 299 S.C. 335, 340, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1989)).
11. Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Burbo v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 106
P.3d 258, 263 (2005)).
12. See id. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
13. See id.
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buyers because it would ensure the availability of adequate protection in covering
defects while decreasing the potential for litigation expenses.
11.

BACKGROUND OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

A.

Development of the Doctrine

Until 1960, the doctrine of caveatemptor-"let the buyer beware"-controlled
the majority of land transactions between a home buyer and a seller of undeveloped
land. 4 Because sellers sold undeveloped land, the seller rarely faced implied
warranty claims for construction defects; the buyer could bring claims against the
architect or contractor with whom the buyer was in privity for construction
defects.' 5 After World War 11, the dramatic increase in the need for housing set the
stage for a rapid rise in the construction of homes.' 6 Accordingly, builders began
to "sell the house and the land together in a package deal." 7 As a result, purchasers
were no longer able to supervise construction," leading to a decline in the quality
of building.' 9 Thus, buyers of defective homes began seeking recovery from
builders, challenging the doctrine of caveat emptor,2 ° while commentators called
for modification of this doctrine. 2'
Initially, caveat emptor governed real estate transactions within South
Carolina; 22 as a result, the seller of a new home was unaccountable for the quality
of the dwelling absent an express guarantee or warranty to the purchaser.23 South
Carolina courts, along with the majority of jurisdictions, have shifted from caveat
emptor to caveat venditor to provide buyers greater protection from physical
defects.24 The shift began with Rogers v. Scyphers,25 a case in which the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that when the vendor of a new home is also the

14. See Jack R. Lawrence, Homebuilder'sLiabilityfor Physical Defects After the Sale, 7 OKLA.
CTY U. L. REV. 49, 49 (1982) (stating that in 1960 the sale of real estate was governed by caveat
emptor); Melissa C. Tronquet, Comment, There'sNo Place Like Home... Until You DiscoverDefects:
Do Prelitigation Statutes Relating to Construction Defect Cases Really Protect the Needs of
Homeowners and Developers?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1249, 1253 (2004) (stating that buyers had
the burden of ensuring quality of real estate sales under caveat emptor); see also Kennedy v. Columbia
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 342-43, 384 S.E.2d 730, 735 (1989) (providing a brief review of
the historical developments that led to a transition from caveat emptor to caveat venditor).
15. See Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 342, 384 S.E.2d at 735.
16. Id. at 343, 384 S.E.2d at 735; Tronquet, supra note 14, at 1253.
17. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 53 (quoting E. F. Roberts, The Case ofthe Unwary Home Buyer:
The HousingMerchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 343, 384 S.E.2d at 735.
19. Tronquet, supra note 14, at 1253 54.
20. Id. at 1254.
21.
Lawrence, supra note 14, at 53 ("[M]odern day changes in home-buying
practices ... increased pressure ... to abandon or modify the ancient doctrine [of caveat emptor].").
22. See Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S.C. 112, 114, 160 S.E.2d 560, 561 (1968) (citing Lessly v. Bowie,
27 S.C. 193, 197, 3 S.E. 199, 200 (1887)).
23. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 483 (Aspen Publisher 5th ed. 2003).
24. See Richard C. Webb, Note, Liabilityfor ConstructionDefects in ResidentialRealty: A ReExamination in Light of Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 42 S.C. L. REV. 503,
504-05 (1991).
25. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
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builder, the vendor may be liable for breach of implied warranty damages upon sale
of the home.26 In Rogers, the court acknowledged its support for the trend in other
jurisdictions to recognize liability based solely on the theory of implied warranty.2 7
The court premised such support on the inability of buyers to properly inspect a
home for latent defects due to their lack of knowledge of the complexities involved
in construction.28
Subsequently, in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff2 9 the court formally accepted the
theory of caveat venditor3 Following the purchase of a new home from a buildervendor, the buyer experienced flooding due to the builder's improper placement of
the septic tank and field drains in the rear of the house."' Affirming a judgment of
defective installation,32 the court noted that buyers need the protection of an implied
warranty of habitability because they must frequently rely on the seller as an expert
in construction. 3' The court based this conclusion on the fact that buyers are often
"precluded from making a knowledgeable inspection of the completed
house ... because of the expense and ... because the defects are usually hidden
rendering inspection practically impossible.,, 34 Finally, the court held that there
existed in the sale of a new home by a builder-vendor an implied warranty that the
house is suitable for habitation. 5 Almost twenty years later, the South Carolina
Supreme Court noted that Rutledge established the implied warranty of habitability
"*as an independent covenant which survives delivery of the deed," effectively
abrogating "the doctrine of merger by deed. 3 6
In subsequent cases the court applied and extended the doctrine of the implied
warranty of habitability with regard to the sale of new homes on the basis "that a
sound price warrants a sound commodity. 37 In Lane v. Trenholm Building Co., the
court held that a developer-seller who did not build the home was subject to implied
warranty liability 38 for the presence of a faulty septic tank.39 Because the developer
held itself out to the consumer as one in the business of selling homes and as one
aware of the buyer's intention to provide a home for his family, the court's finding
of an implied warranty effectively fulfilled the expectations of the parties.4"
Following the court's departure from the doctrine of merger by deed in
Rutledge,4 Terlinde v. Neely4 2 abandoned the requirement that a buyer be in privity

26. Id. at133, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
27. Id.at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
28. Id.at 135, 161 S.E.2d at 84.
29. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
30. See id.at414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
31. Id. at4 10-1, 175 S.E.2d at 793 94.
32. Id. at 411 12, 175 S.E.2d at 794.
33. Id.at414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 343, 384 S.E.2d 730, 735 (1989).
37. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 502, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. at 503 04, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
39. Id. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
40. Id.at503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
41. See supratext accompanying note 36.
42. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
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of contract with the builder.43 In Terlinde, the buyer purchased a home built for
speculative sale-"not pursuant to any contract with a purchaser."44 As such, the
buyer was not in privity of contract with the builder.45 Upon discovery of
foundation problems within the home, the buyer brought several claims against the
builder, including a claim for breach of an implied warranty.46 Rejecting the
builder's privity defense, the court relied on the reasoning in Lane, stating that an
implied warranty "springs from the sale" of the new home.47 Moreover, if the
purchaser does not know the builder of the house, the purchaser still relies on the
expertise of the builder.48 Thus, an implied warranty against latent defects extends
to subsequent purchasers of a new home.49
Finally, inArvai v. Shaw, ° the South Carolina Supreme Court held that implied
warranty liability should fall on the source that places the defective home into the
stream of commerce by initial sale."' In noting that the "implied warranty of
habitability has its roots in the execution of a contract for sale,' ', 2 the court held that
"[t]he determining factor is not whether the defendant actually builds the defective
house, but that he places it, by the initial sale, into the stream of commerce."53
Accordingly, the court's holding set the stage for a lender who is also the seller of
the home to be subjected to the implied warranty of habitability.
B. Application of Caveat Venditor to Lenders
In mostj urisdictions, a mere lender is not liable to the purchaser of a new home
for construction defects.54 Instead, the buyer traditionally looks to the builder or
contractor for relief in tort or contract for construction defect claims.5" However,
with the emergence of construction lenders becoming joint venturers by assuming
the role of the developer or seller of the new home, the question emerges as to
whether the buyer's contract remedies should extend to the lender.

43. Id. at398-99, 271 S.E.2d at769-70.
44. Id.at 396, 271 S.E.2d at 768.
45. Id.
46. Id. at395-96, 271 S.E.2d at768.
47. Id. at 398, 271 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 500, 229
S.E.2d 728, 729 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See id.at 399, 271 S.E.2d at770 ("[lit is clearly foreseeable that more than the original
purchaser [of a home] will seek to enjoy the fruits of the builder's efforts.").
49. Id.
50. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
51. Id. at164, 345 S.E.2d at 717.
52. Id. (citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982)).
53. Id.
54. See Walter, supra note 6, at 507 08 (stating that liability will only be imposed on lenders
because of contractual provisions or lender assurances, or where lender activity exceeds that of a mere
lender).
55. Id.at 507.
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1. Lender Liability in Other Jurisdictions
In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass 'n,56 the California Supreme
' 7
Court held that lenders will be liable in tort when they are an "active participant"
in the construction of a new home and subsequently breach a duty of care to the
buyers due to construction defects in the home.58 In Connor,the buyers discovered
cracks in the foundation of their homes as a result of soil expansion and brought
suit against Great Western for breaching an independent duty of care. 59 Relying
upon its own precedent, the California Supreme Court held Great Western liable for
its failure to exercise reasonable care in protecting the buyers from construction
defects.6" The court imposed tort liability on the lender because the lender knew of
the developer's undercapitalization and inexperience, 6 thus making it reasonably
foreseeable that the developer would cut corners in its construction of the homes.62
In response to Connor, California enacted legislation" that restricted lender
liability to circumstances in which construction defects were a direct or proximate
result of the lender's nonlending activities and misrepresentations.64 Other
jurisdictions appear to follow California by "limiting the liability of lenders to
situations in which they have become in essence joint venturers., 6' In Terrace
Condominium Ass 'n v. Midlantic NationalBank,66 the New Jersey Superior Court
held that a lender that took title to a condominium in lieu of foreclosure and
subsequently finished construction on the units was subject to implied warranty
liability.6 7 Because the lender held itself out to the public as a builder-vendor, the
court rejected its defense that it was merely a "mortgagee-in-possession." 68
Accordingly, the court held,
[S]ince Midlantic took over construction, it must be held to have
assumed all of the obligations and responsibilities of the initial
builder and developer and to have become a full-fledged "buildervendor," responsible for all defects, including those beyond the
scope of what it perceives to be its own limited construction
activities.6 9

56. 447 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1968) (in bank).
57. Id.
at 616.
58. Id. at619-20.
59. Id. at611.
60. Id. at 617 (applying a six-part test espoused by the California Supreme Court ten years prior
inBiakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)).
61. Id.
at617 (finding the "onerous" burden of the loans aggravated the financial situation of the
developer).
62. Id.
63. See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 23, at 505 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West
1997)); Webb, supra note 24, at511 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434).
64. Webb, supra note 24, at512.
65. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 23, at505.
66. 633 A.2d 1060 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
67. Id. at1062-64.
68. Id. at1064 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
at 1065.
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2.

South Carolina:Early Lender Liability

In early South Carolina cases involving implied warranties, the supreme court
focused liability on the builder and the vendor;7" in later decisions, the court
expanded liability to lenders. 7' In Roundtree Villas Ass 'n v. 4701 Kings Corp.,72 a
purchaser brought a construction defects action against a lender under a theory of
implied warranty.73 The lender created a corporation to sell housing units, and the
builder subsequently deeded the remaining unsold units to this corporation, which
sold the units." After numerous complaints regarding the roofs and balconies in the
units, and in an effort to increase the marketability of the remaining unsold units,
the lender hired an inspection team to determine the extent of the repairs needed.75
Instead of adopting a more costly method that would remedy the problem, the
lender opted for a temporary solution.76 When the problem persisted, the purchasers
brought an action against the lender for a breach of an implied warranty." In
rejecting the extension of liability to a lender for construction defects, the court
noted that an implied warranty is effectively a contract; because the record was
devoid of facts indicating the presence of a contractual agreement between the
lender and purchasers, liability did not extend to the lender.8
Five years later, in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & ManufacturingCo., 79 the
court recognized the potential liability under the implied warranty of habitability
for a lender that has a substantial involvement in the construction of a home. 80
Columbia Lumber supplied materials to a builder for the construction of a home. 8'
After substantially completing the house, the builder encountered difficulty in
repaying its loans to Columbia Lumber." Instead of foreclosing on its mechanics
lien on the property, Columbia Lumber took title to the home and subsequently sold
the home to Kennedy. 83 Six years later, Kennedy discovered a crack in the brick
veneer, and inspections revealed that a faulty foundation caused the crack.84

70. See, e.g., Arvai v. Shaw, 289 S.C. 161, 164, 345 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1986) (stating that implied
warranty liability arises from placement of a defective home into the stream of commerce by the
vendor); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970) (holding that a buildervendor that sells a home warrants its suitability for habitation); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 133,
161 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1968) (stating that a builder-vendor may be subjected to implied warranty liability
after the sale of a home).
71. See, e.g., Kirkman v. Parex, Inc., 369 S.C. 477, 486, 632 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2006) (holding that
a lender that is substantially involved in the construction of a home and that does not effectively
disclaim the implied warranty of habitability may be subject to lender liability); Kennedy v. Columbia
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 340-41, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1989) (discussing four situations in
which a lender may incur liability).
72. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
73. See id. at 423, 321 S.E.2d at 51.
74. Id. at419-20, 321 S.E.2d at49.
75. Id. at 420, 321 S.E.2d at 49.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 418, 321 S.E.2d at 48.
78. Id. at423, 321 S.E.2d at 51.
79. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
80. Id. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
81. Id. at 338, 384 S.E.2d at 732.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 338, 384 S.E.2d at 732-33.
84. Id. at 338, 384 S.E.2d at 733.
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Kennedy then brought a claim against Columbia Lumber for a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability."5 In discussing whether Columbia Lumber would be liable
in this situation, the court outlined various scenarios that imposed liability upon
lenders: where the lender is also the developer;86 where the lender knowingly makes
false, express representations to a buyer; 7 where the lender is in essence a joint
venturer;" where the lender's business is so intertwined with the builder's so as to
obscure the legal distinctions between the two;8 9 and in the peculiar instance where
a lender "forecloses on a developer in the midst of construction, takes title, has
substantial involvement in completing the construction," and then sells the home
itself.90 However, because Columbia Lumber did not act in any of these capacities,
the court did not hold the company liable under the implied warranty of
habitability. 91
111. KIRKMAN V.PAREX, INC.
In Kirkman v. Parex, Inc.,92 the court revisited the test of substantial
involvement espoused in Kennedy.9 The Kirkmans entered into a contract for the
sale of a home with Miller Housing Corporation. 94 In turn, Miller Housing received
financing from First Union to build the home. 95 Before Miller Housing could
complete the construction, financial difficulties arose that compelled First Union
to foreclose on the loan." First Union hired a contractor to finish the construction
of the home, and upon completion of the house, the Kirkmans received a deed
stating that the house was sold "as is" and disclaiming the implied warranty of
habitability .9

After the sale, the Kirkmans spent approximately $45,000 repairing defective
artificial stucco on the exterior of the home.98 The Kirkmans then brought a claim
for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against First Union as the seller
of the property, alleging they were unaware of the "as is" provision and disclaimer
within the deed for the house.99 The circuit court granted summary judgment in
favor of First Union upon a finding that the bank was a mere lender and thus could
not have impliedly warranted the habitability of the house. 100 The court of appeals

85. Id.
86. Id. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 340-41, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
91. Id. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
92. 369 S.C. 477, 632 S.E.2d 854 (2006).
93. See id. at 483 85, 632 S.E.2d at 857 58.
94. Id. at 480, 632 S.E.2d at 855.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 480, 632 S.E.2d at 855 56.
97. Id. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 856.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 481 82, 632 S.E.2d at 856.
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affirmed,'' and the supreme court granted the Kirkmans' petition for a writ of
certiorari.'° 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the trial court's and appellate
court's determination that First Union was a mere lender0 3 and held that there
remained "a genuine issue of material fact whether First Union was substantially
involved in completing the construction" of the home.' °4 The court then noted that
if, on remand, First Union is found to have been substantially involved without
having disclaimed liability, it impliedly warranted the habitability of the home.0 5
Thus, upon a finding of substantial involvement, the lower court must next
determine if First Union effectively disclaimed the warranty. °6 While the
requirements for a disclaimer are stringent,0 7 they would relieve First Union of
liability if met. However, if the fact finder determines that First Union was
substantially involved and did not disclaim the implied warranty, the lower court
should then conduct a determination as to whether First Union breached the implied
warranty.'0 8
Kirkman signals the potential for lender liability in accordance with the court's
historic adherence to caveat venditor.'0 9 However, as discussed in Parts IV and V,
the test of substantial involvement and the specifically-bargained-for element of
effective disclaimers leave lenders uncertain about how to avoid liability for a
breach of implied warranty.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT REQUIREMENT FOR LENDER LIABILITY AS A BASIS
OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision to reverse Kirkman and remand
the case to the circuit court signals the emergence of potential lender liability in
contract under the implied warranty of habitability. This extension of liability is
consistent with otherjurisdictions' imposition of liability on a lender who partakes
in nonlender activity" 0 and is sound as a matter of public policy because it affords
buyers greater protection. Yet, in its attempt to adhere to the doctrine of caveat
venditor, the court has left lenders uncertain as to what specific actions constitute
substantial involvement. Uncertain about what actions qualify as substantial
involvement, lenders remain uncertain about the type of actions that could expose
them to liability under the implied warranty of habitability.

101. Id. at 482, 632 S.E.2d at 856.
102. Id. at 480, 632 S.E.2d at 855.
103. Id. at 483-84, 632 S.E.2d at 857.
104. Id. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. ("We adopt the requirements set forth by the Washington Court of Appeals: the
disclaimer 'must be (1) conspicuous, (2) known to the buyer, and (3) specifically bargained for."'
(quoting Burbo v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 106 P.3d 258, 263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005))).
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 24-53.
110. See discussion supra Part IIB. 1.
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In Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co.,"'1 the court refused to
impose implied warranty liability on a mere lender but recognized potential lender
liability in certain situations." 2 Specifically, the Kennedy court noted,
[A] lender can be held liable if it is also a developer.... Liability
may also attach when the lender becomes highly involved with
construction in a manner that is not normal commercial practice
for a lender. In such a situation, the lender might be said to be a
joint venturer. The lender may be liable if it is so amalgamated
with the developer or builder so as to blur its legal distinction. A
lender may also be liable where it forecloses on a developer in the
midst of construction, takes title, has substantial involvement in
completing the construction and sells homes. 113
Thus, the court's separation of a developer,joint venturer, or amalgamate from the
substantial involvement situation indicates that this fourth category is distinct from
the other three situations; however, it leaves lenders uncertain as to when their
conduct will fit within this distinct category.
Prior caselaw illustrates scenarios of lender liability in the context of
developers," 4 joint venturers,' 15 or amalgamated lenders" 6 but does not provide a
fact pattern in which a lender was substantially involved. Apparently, a lender is
considered a developer when it is also involved in the development of the home
sold to the purchasers.' Similarly, a lender is presumably ajoint venturer when the
lender has an equity ownership in the project with another entity." 8 Likewise, a
lender is deemed to be amalgamated if it merges with a developer or builder so as
to appear to be a united entity.' 19
Thus, lenders can be reasonably certain as to when they will fall into these
categories and be subject to implied warranty liability; however, they are left with
uncertainty in predicting what actions will subject them to liability for being
substantially involved. In its articulation of this test, the Kirkman court held that an
affirmative finding of substantial involvement is not based on whether the lender
was responsible for installation of the defective portion of the new home 2 ' but
instead involves a question of fact for a jury.121 However, the court's failure to

111. 299 S.C. 355, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
112. See id. at 340 41, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
113. Id. at 340-41, 384 S.E.2d at 734 (internal citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 499-501,229 S.E.2d 728,729 (1976)
(discussing facts in which a lender was also a developer).
115. See, e.g., Cent. Bank, N.A. v. Baldwin, 583 P.2d 1087, 1088 89 (Nev. 1978) (finding that
a bank's subsidiary's ownership of half the stock of a developer, in addition to overtures on behalf of
the subsidiary towards the developer, necessitated a finding of a joint venture).
116. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 96, 344 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Ct. App.
1986) (finding that the cross-ownership of all parties concerned in the development required the court
to decide the lender was amalgamated with the seller).
117. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 340, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734
(1989).
118. See id. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
119. See id. at 340-41, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
120. Kirkman v. Parex, Inc., 369 S.C. 477, 484, 632 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2006).
121. Id. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
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outline factors tending to support or reject a finding of substantial involvement
compounds lender uncertainty.
As stated in Kirkman, if a trier of fact determines a lender is substantially
involved in completing the construction of a new home, then the lender is held to
have impliedly warranted the dwelling.'2 2 Accordingly, without a clear definition
of what constitutes substantial involvement, lenders likely will begin attempting to
disclaim the implied warranty of habitability for property they sell to avoid this
uncertainty. But, even if lenders attempt to place a disclaimer in every sales
contract, they must still determine if their disclaimer will be effective.
V.

DISCLAIMERS OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY BY FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The prevailing view is that sellers may disclaim the implied warranty of
habitability. 123 In Kirkman, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the
Washington court's requirements for a valid disclaimer of this warranty: a seller's
disclaimer of the implied warranty "must be (1) conspicuous, (2) known to the
buyer, and (3) specifically bargained for."' 24 The court in Kirkman mandated a strict
application of these three prongs and indicated that fulfillment of these
requirements will only be met in rare circumstances.' 25 Additionally, whether each
requirement is satisfied is a jury issue that can be supported or contradicted by
extrinsic evidence.' 26 Based on caselaw, the first two requirements apparently will
easily be fulfilled with a standard form and initialing requirement;' 27 however, how
the seller will prove satisfaction of the third element remains unclear.'28
A.

Conspicuous: Caselaw

While the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) does not apply to the implied
warranty of habitability,' 29 South Carolina courts have extended its application to
30
non-UCC cases for guidance in determining whether a disclaimer is conspicuous.
South Carolina's codified version of the UCC's definition of conspicuous'3' states
that a clause is considered conspicuous "when it is so written that a reasonable

122. Id.
123. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 23, at503; see also Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 485, 632
S.E.2d at 858 (agreeing with the stance of the Alabama Supreme Court "that the principle of freedom
of contract permits a party to effectively disclaim the implied warrant of habitability" (quoting Turner
v. Westhampton Court, L.L.C., 903 So. 2d 82, 93 (Ala. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124. Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 485,632 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Burbo v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 106
P.3d 258, 263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id.
126. See id.at 485-86, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
127. See infra notes 128 50 and accompanying text.
128. See Burbo, 106 P.3d at 263 (concluding summarily that an attempted disclaimer "was not
negotiated"); Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409,411 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (recognizing that disclaimers
of the implied warranty of habitability "are strictly construed against the builder-vendor").
129. See Conran v. Yager, 263 S.C. 417, 421 22, 211 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1975) ("Article 2[] of the
Uniform Commercial Code is inapplicable to real estate sales ....
").
130. See, e.g., Jones v. Gen. Elec. Co., 331 S.C. 351, 362, 503 S.E.2d 173, 179 (Ct. App. 1998)
(utilizing the UCC for guidance in a case involving a disclaimer in an employee manual).
131. See S.C. CODEANN. § 36-1-201(10) (2003).
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person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.,'' 32 The statute states
that a disclaimer is conspicuous if it has a printed heading in capital letters or if the
language is larger or of a contrasting type or color than the rest of the print in the
form document.' 33
In Nettles v. Techplan Corp.,'34 the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina emphasized the location of the disclaimer and granted summary
judgment for an employer even though the clause in question was not in bold or
contrasting type or of a different color. 3 5 As outlined by the court,
South Carolina cases applying the UCC definition of
.,conspicuous" consistently consider three factors in determining
whether a certain disclaimer is or is not conspicuous. First, the
courts consider the type-setting of the disclaimer, i.e. if the
disclaimer is in the same type as the remainder of the agreement
containing the disclaimer. Second, the courts have looked to the
color of the print in which the disclaimer is written. Finally, the
courts consider
the location of the disclaimer within the document
36
or contract.
The court held that the positioning of the disclaimer on the first page of the manual
was "sufficiently conspicuous such that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it.""' However, in South CarolinaElectric & Gas
Co. v. Combustion Engineering,Inc.,' 3 8 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a disclaimer not set apart from the text by color or type and located seventeen3
pages into a twenty-two page single spaced document was not conspicuous.1 1
Moreover, in a case where the language of a disclaimer was in all capital letters, the
court of appeals found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the clause was
conspicuous because it was not underlined or set apart by a contrasting type or
color. 4' These holdings illustrate the myriad of factors sometimes dispositive,
sometimes not-courts may consider in determining the issue of conspicuousness,
none of which appear to be outcome determinative. 4 '

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988).
135. Id. at 98.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 283 S.C. 182, 322 S.E.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1984).
139. Id. at 186, 322 S.E.2d at 456.
140. See Jones v. Gen. Elec. Co., 331 S.C. 351,364-65, 503 S.E.2d 173, 180-81 (Ct. App. 1998).
But see Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1038-39 (D.S.C. 1993)
(stating that a clause is conspicuous if it is printed in capital letters that are in large type).
141. See Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1038. The court concluded that the various
factors to be considered by a court in determining whether a document is conspicuous for purposes of
disclaiming an implied warranty pursuant to section 36-2-316(2) of the South Carolina Code include
the following:
(1) the color of print in which the purported disclaimer appears; (2) the style of
print in which the disclaimer is written: (3) the size of the disclaiming language,
particularly in relation to other print in the document: (4) the location of the
disclaimer in the contract; (5) the appearance of the term "merchantability" with
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A paradigmatic case in which a disclaimer would clearly be conspicuous would
be one in which the party intending to disclaim differentiated the disclaimer by size,
font, and color.' 42 Where an employer placed a disclaimer on the cover of an
employment manual, on a separate page of the handbook, and typed the disclaimer
in a larger font than the rest of the text, the court held the disclaimer to be
conspicuous."' Thus, it appears that a lender could successfully meet the
"conspicuous" requirement by clearly labeling the disclaimer in differing font, size,
or color from that used in the sales contract.
B. Known to the Buyer
South Carolina Code section 36-1-201 (10) provides that for a disclaimer to be
conspicuous it should be written so that a reasonable person ought to notice it.' 44
However, Kirkman's second requirement that the disclaimer be "known to the
buyer" presents a more stringent standard than that set forth in the UCC; the rule
announced by the supreme court requires actual knowledge' 45 as compared to the
less rigid UCC standard that a reasonable person "ought to have noticed" the
disclaimer. 4 6 Because of this more stringent standard, lenders are now left with the
burden of proof in demonstrating that the disclaimer was known to the buyer.
In Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, Inc.,' 47 the Appellate Court of Illinois
denied the buyers' claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability based
on the finding that one of the buyers initialed in the margin next to the disclaimer
language in the sales contract.'4 8 Because the buyers were educated and experienced
business people who chose to initial the contract after reading it, the court held that
this action signaled their acceptance of the terms of the disclaimer.'49 In addition
to emphasizing the presence of the buyers' initials, the court also examined
testimony of the buyers' conversation with the sales agent in which the buyers
stated that they understood that placing their initials on the contract signaled their
understanding of the implications of the disclaimer.' As a result of these factual
findings, the court concluded that the buyers were put on notice of the disclaiming

respect to color, style, size, and type of print in the disclaimer clause; and (6) the
status of the parties contesting the validity of the disclaimer, namely whether they
be consumers or commercially sophisticated entities. While these factors lend aid
to the determination of what constitutes "conspicuous" language, the court
believes that no single factor is dispositive nor are these enumerated factors
exhaustive of all the criteria that can be used in examining a disclaimer.
Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (2003)).
142. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(10) Kumpfv. United Tel. Co. of the Carolinas, 311 S.C.
533, 538, 429 S.E.2d 869, 872 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the absence of factors such as color, font,
and a distinctive border calling attention to the disclaimer supported the decision that it was not
conspicuous).
143. See Marr v. City of Columbia, 307 S.C. 545, 547, 416 S.E.2d 615, 616 (1992).
144. S.C. CODEANN. § 36-1-201(10).
145. See Burbo v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 106 P.3d 258, 263 (Wash. CE App. 2005) (citing
Olmsted v. Mulder, 863 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Wash. C. App. 1993)).
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(10).
147. 616 N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
148. Id. at 620.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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language and had waived their right to claim a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability.''
Thus, it appears that one way a lender will satisfy the "conspicuous" and
"known to the buyer" requirements is through the creation of a standard disclaimer
form. Both elements can be satisfied by creating a separate section clearly labeled
"Disclaimer of the Implied Warranty of Habitability" that is in a type differing in
size, color, or font from the original sales contract and that requires the buyer to
acknowledge his acceptance of its terms. Apparently, this requirement would be
fulfilled by having a buyer initial beside the disclaimer, indicating that the buyer
acknowledged, read, and understood the ramifications of the disclaimer. However,
lenders likely will face uncertainty in determining whether the disclaimer was
specifically bargained for.
C. Specifically BargainedFor
The UCC recognizes a bargaining element present in sales transactions that is
useful in attempting to determine the meaning of the third prong of the disclaimer
test-whether the seller specifically bargained for the disclaimer. 152 As stated in the
South Carolina Reporter's Comments to South Carolina Code section 38-2-316, 15
the statute aims to protect a buyer from receiving a product the buyer did not
bargain for while still affording the seller an opportunity to expressly disclaim
implied warranty obligations. 154 However, because the UCC does not mandate
negotiation of a disclaimer, Kirkman presents lenders with a stricter standard of
proving a disclaimer was specifically bargained for in negotiations between the
buyer and seller.'1 5 Lenders will face uncertainty in determining how to meet this
standard as there is a lack of caselaw illustrating the types of factors that would
fulfill this requirement. Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed the issue.
A California court has held a disclaimer is not specifically bargained for if it
is given to the buyer after the sale is complete. 56 The court reasoned that a buyer
cannot bargain for the implications of a disclaimer of implied warranties, or the
limitations that accompany this waiver, if the disclaimer is not presented to the
buyer until after the sale. 157 In addition to this factor, lenders may also look to
Kirkman, which suggests the price reduction of a home as an example of a desired

151. Id.
152. See Kirkman v. Parex, Inc., 369 S.C. 477, 485, 632 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2006) (quoting Burbo
v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 106 P.3d 258, 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316 note (2003) (South Carolina Reporter's Comments).
154. Id.
155. See Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Burbo, 106 P.3d at 262) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
156. Dorman v. Int'l. Harvester Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522 (Ct. App. 1975) (citing Int'l
Harvester Co. v. Pike, 466 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Ark. 1971); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d
195, 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968)).
157. See id. at 523 (quoting Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972)): Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[A]s a general
proposition, a seller may not 'spring' a warranty disclaimer on a customer after a sale has been
consummated; the parties must have understood that... any disclaimers.., were part of their deal.").
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benefit a buyer would exchange for knowingly disclaiming the protection of the
implied warranty of habitability.'
However, aside from a basic prohibition against imposing disclaimers on
buyers after the completion of a sale and price reduction, little guidance exists that
illustrates how a lender may prove that the seller specifically bargained for the
disclaimer. Thus, there will remain much uncertainty on the part of lenders in
discovering what factors will be indicative of proving fulfillment of this
requirement. This uncertainty of the specifically-bargained-for element coupled
with the uncertainty of the substantial-involvement test supports use of an
alternative method by which lenders can avoid implied warranty liability while still
affording the buyer protection from latent defects.
VI. A SUGGESTION FOLLOWING

THE K[RKMANDECISION: LEGISLATION ALLOWING
A LENDER OR DEVELOPER TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INSURANCE

Kirkman is sound as a matter of policy because it seeks to ensure that buyers
receive the benefit of their bargain by imposing liability for construction defects on
lenders who were substantially involved in the construction; such lenders are better
situated to avoid construction defects. However, because lenders likely will incur
substantial difficulty in determining what constitutes substantial involvement and
in proving that the seller specifically bargained for a disclaimer, this section
discusses a legislative alternative whereby additional insurance could be acquired
by the lender or developer. Such insurance would be obtained in lieu of disclaiming
the implied warranty ofhabitability and would coincide with the policy of affording
the buyer of a new home protection from latent defects.
A.

Policy Implications of the Kirkman Decision: General Policy Behind
Caveat Venditor

Because caveat venditor is premised "on the just philosophy that a sound price
warrants a sound commodity,"'5 9 it follows that when buyers pay a fair price for a
new home they should receive what they bargained for a home suitable for
habitation. 6 ° Expecting a buyer to give up a large amount of money for the
purchase of a new home' 6 ' without receiving adequate compensation in the form
of a habitable dwelling and protection from latent defects would contradict public
policy.'62 The implied warranty of habitability is one of three implied warranties

158. See Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858 ("[The three-part disclaimer test] will
protect buyers but also give them freedom to purposefully bargain for a price discount or other desired
benefit.").
159. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 502, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
160. See id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 730-31.
161. See id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731 (stating that the purchase of a home likely involves the
investment of the buyer's life savings and a mortgage); Comment, Liability of the InstitutionalLender
for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 739, 753 (1968) ("Buying a home is
generally the largest investment a family ever makes.").
162. Lane, 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
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recognized within construction law in South Carolina. 6 ' The recognition of three
implied warranties illustrates the desire of South Carolina courts to protect a
purchaser from latent defects. 6 4 Because the primary purpose of a home sale is to
provide a buyer with a home that is suitable for habitation, 6 5the innocent purchaser
is forced to rely on the builder who holds itself out to be an expert in
construction."' Thus, the emergence and adoption of caveat venditor in South
Carolina serves to afford innocent buyers greater protection from latent defects in
a transaction in which they are unfamiliar with construction techniques and must
rely on the expertise of builders.
B. Policy of Lender Liability
The rationale supporting builder-vendor liability under the implied warranty
of habitability is that buyers have an unequal bargaining position in relation to
sellers.' 67 The potential for lender liability under the implied warranty shifts the
responsibility of ensuring that the home is free from latent defects to lenders that
are substantially involved in the construction of a home. This shift of potential
liability results from the fact that purchasers cannot readily discover latent defects
because of such factors as the average buyer's unfamiliarity with construction and
the expense of hiring an inspector.'68
Where a lender goes beyond the normal role of a mere lender and is
concurrently a developer, joint venturer, or has substantial involvement in the
completion of the home, that lender may be subjected to implied warranty liability
similar to that of a builder-vendor. 6 9 Such imposition of liability affords buyers
greater assurance and fulfills the reasonable expectations ofthose contemplating the
use of the home as a dwelling for their families. Moreover, extension of implied
warranty liability to lenders provides purchasers with a remedy where a builder
lacks the financial resources to cure a construction defect. Hence, when compared
with an innocent purchaser, lenders are in a better position to avoid such
construction defects and, through the potential imposition of liability, have
incentive to prevent the faulty construction of a home.
The Kirkman decision ensures that when a lender places a home in the stream
of commerce by selling it to a buyer for a fair price, the buyer's bargain for a

163. LAWRENCE C. MELTON, SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTRUCTION LAW 352-53 (2005) (listing the
three implied warranties recognized in South Carolina construction law as the following: (1) the
"[i]mplied warranty that plans and specifications are sufficient 'for the purpose in view"'; (2) the
"[b]uilder's [i]mplied warranty of workmanlike service"; and (3) the "[s]eller's [i]mplied warranty of
fitness and habitability").
164. See id. at 351 ("Implied warranties are created by law to protect the purchaser from latent
defects.").
165. Lane, 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 730-31.
166. Rutledge v. Dodenhofl, 254 S.C. 407, 414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970).
167. Id. at 413 14, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
168. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 398,271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980) ("[T]he character of
society has changed such that the ordinary buyer is not in a position to discover hidden defects in a
structure, especially at a time when he is provided more elaborate furnishings which tend to obscure the
structural integrity of the facility."); Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 411, 175 S.E.2d at 794 (noting that a
prospective purchaser would not be able to discover whether a sewer system was properly installed).
169. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 340-41, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734
(1989).
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habitable dwelling is protected. Thus, Kirkman is sound as a matter of policy
because it imposes liability on lenders that are substantially involved in the building
of a house, unless the lenders effectively disclaim the implied warranty and, 17in0
exchange, the buyers receive a negotiated discount or other "desired benefit."'
However, as discussed previously, the holding creates two uncertainties: what
constitutes substantial involvement and when a disclaimer is specifically bargained
for.' 7 1 Such uncertainties on the part of lenders are bound to lead to an increase in
lending costs. Accordingly, the Kirkman decision leaves unanswered the question
of whether there is a way to obtain the policy benefits of imposing implied warranty
liability on lenders without increasing the costs associated with the sale of a home.
C. PotentialLegislation
While the policy implications of Kirkman are sound, the uncertainty presented
to lenders by this decision is substantial. Moreover, courts are likely to construe
disclaimers in favor of the buyer,172 exacerbating the troubles lenders will have with
determining how to effectively protect themselves. One way to deal with the costs
of these uncertainties is for the South Carolina legislature to offer a possible
alternative to the framework presented in Kirkman. Such an alternative would allow
lenders who provide or arrange for adequate insurance in the event of construction
defects to be relieved of implied warranty liability. This type of insurance would
protect innocent purchasers from construction defects while simultaneously
reducing uncertainty for lenders.
Accordingly, the proposed alternative solution of this Note is the
implementation of legislation requiring lenders or their developers to offer
additional insurance if they disclaim the implied warranty of habitability.' 7 ' The
determination of the type and quantity of coverage deemed to constitute adequate
insurance would be defined either by a statute or by a rule promulgated by an
appropriate agency. For example, adequate insurance could be defined as the full
replacement value of the home as defined by the Insurance Commission. Such
legislation would provide a statutory safe harbor for lenders by giving them the
option to avoid liability as long as the lender carries adequate insurance. This would
effectively relieve lenders of claims under the implied warranty of habitability,
while continuing to afford buyers protection from latent construction defects.
Theoretically, application ofthis alternative to cases like Kirkman would create cost
spreading; the cost of acquiring additional insurance to cover damages arising from
latent defects would be passed on from the lender or developer to the buyer through

170. Kirkman v. Parex, Inc., 369 S.C. 477, 485 86, 632 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2006).
171. See discussion supra Parts IV-V.
172. See Kirkman, at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858 ("[The three-part disclaimer test] is to be applied
strictly and will be met only in rare circumstances.").
173. The proposed legislative solution of this Note is similar to an insurance proposal set forth
previously. See Comment, supra note 161, at 753 ("[T]he loan association could force builder-vendors
to insure against 'products liability' as a condition to receipt of a construction loan, thereby reducing
or even eliminating the occasions where purchasers would seek redress from the association.").
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an increase in the purchase price of the home.'1 4 Additionally, this alternative
creates less potential for litigation costs while still adhering to the doctrine of
caveat venditor.
D. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Ultimately, the lender's decision between utilizing a disclaimer and acquiring
additional insurance would be based on which legal regime best minimizes the
lender's construction loan transactions. Because lenders are likely in the best
position to judge the market, they will be able to determine which option is best
suited for their needs. Where lenders opt to disclaim potential warranty liability,
they are faced with potential liability and litigation costs flowing from the judicial
determination of whether they were substantially involved in the construction and
whether they executed an enforceable disclaimer.f 75 Presumably, if lenders face
greater liability and litigation costs, they will effectively pass these additional costs
on to the consumers by including them in their rate structure. The benefit of this
option to buyers is that they receive protection against construction defects from a
builder or lender, provided the lender is found to have not adequately disclaimed
the implied warranty.' 76 However, whether a disclaimer is effective is subject to
judicial determination; thus, protection for buyers against latent defects is subject
to the risks of litigation-some buyers will receive protection and others will not.
Additionally, a disclaimer presents consumers and lenders with great potential
for substantial litigation costs. Such costs would arise under the method presented
in Kirkman both a lender and buyer will first face judicial determinations of
whether the lender was substantially involved in the construction and whether the
lender successfully disclaimed the implied warranty of habitability. 7 Assuming the
court answers in the affirmative to the former but not the latter, the court would
next have to decide whether an actual breach of the implied warranty had in fact
occurred and determine the proper damages to award the buyer if such a breach
occurred.' This potential problem is compounded by the uncertainty as to whether
the lender will be liable to the buyer for litigation costs in the event of a finding for
the buyer.
If South Carolina provides an alternative under which lenders have the option
to provide insurance and thereby opt out of liability, consumers will be protected
in accordance with caveatvenditor, and lenders would exchange the litigation costs
connected with the enforceability of a disclaimer for the cost of insurance.
Presumably, the increased cost of insurance for lenders would be passed on to
buyers; however, this likely would not be any greater than that currently passed on
to buyers because of litigation costs under the disclaimer method. Alternately, the
lender could require the developer to obtain insurance protecting against such

174. See Comment, Indirect Liabilities of ConstructionLenders in a Development Setting, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 1525, 1562 (1979) ("[C]onstruction lenders are in a position to reduce the risks and
spread the costs of liability ....
[The lender spreads the cost] by passing the cost of insurance on to
builders and ultimately consumers .... ").
175. See Kirkman, 369 S.C. at 486, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
176. See id. at 485, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
177. See id. at 486, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
178. See id. at 485 86, 632 S.E.2d at 858.
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defects before agreeing to grant the developer loans. Regardless of whether the
additional cost of insurance is incurred through increased lending rates or by a
requirement from the lender, the developer could still pass on the cost of insurance
to buyers through an increase in the purchase price.
If the lender chooses to obtain the insurance in lieu of disclaiming the implied
warranty of habitability, this cost could effectively be passed on to builders through
an increase in lending rates. In requiring higher rates on loans, lenders may examine
developer-borrowers more conservatively,' 79 thereby creating the additional
burdens oftime and cost of screening upon the lender. However, any additional cost
incurred by the lender could be effectively passed along to the buyer through an
increase in loan rates. It follows that a more conservative screening process likely
would have a greater impact on smaller, less financially-stable developers than on
those with greater financial stability. 8 ' An obvious downside to this type of market
impact is that such domination over the development market could weaken the
price competition within the industry;' therefore, buyers could potentially be
driven out of the market by an increase in housing prices.
However, as mortgages are typically paid off in monthly installments over
multiple years, even significant price inflation likely would not drastically increase
monthly payments;' 82 thus, the likelihood of driving consumers out of the market
would not be considerable. Additionally, while such screening could drive smaller,
less financially stable developers out of the market, consumers may be willing to
pay more for homes built by developers who have passed the elevated tests of the
lenders. Such recognition by the lender as being financially sound would naturally
elevate the reputation of a developer and be appealing to buyers making such a
major purchase, thus serving as justification for paying an increased price in
housing.'83
While arguably the buyer is effectively paying for the cost of litigation of both
successful and unmeritorious claims that may not be the buyer's claims,'84 this cost
should be weighed against the risk and potential cost the buyer would incur if faced
with bringing a suit against the lender. As lenders or developers would merely file
claims with their respective insurance carriers to settle claims for latent defects,
parties would only be presented with court costs when a dispute arose as to damage
amounts. Thus, this legislative alternative would benefit consumers as protection

179. See Comment, supra note 174, at 1562.
180. See id.at 1562 63.
181. See id.at 1563.
182. See Comment, supra note 161, at 755.
183. Such additional insurance would serve as a "signaling" device similar to those discussed in
Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales ofNew Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty
Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof 1993 Wis. L.
REV. 13, 69 (1993). Specifically, Professor Sovern stated,
Signaling theorists contend that consumers interpret warranties as statements
about the quality of the item warranted. Manufacturers who sell more reliable
products may offer better warranties at less cost than manufacturers who sell
goods of lower quality; therefore, the theory goes, consumers who [want] more
reliable products should search for the best warranty coverage.
Id.
184. See Comment, supranote 161, at 754 ("Those increased construction costs... pass[ed] on
to home purchasers in the form of higher prices will spread the costs of compensating victims of
construction defects among all purchasers.").
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would be ensured by an increase in price perhaps through monthly mortgage
payments-as compared to the potential large, one-time sum for litigation that may
or may not result favorably for the buyer.
In examining the two alternatives, the question becomes, "Which is the more
cost effective option?" Because lenders are in the best position to make this
determination, the adoption of the legislative alternative will allow them to
implement the method that is most efficient. In either system, buyers will receive
protection from latent construction defects while lenders can choose the alternative
that is better suited for each transaction.' 85 However, the legislative alternative
presented above is probably the superior solution because it assures buyers greater
protection from latent construction defects and decreases potential litigation costs
for lenders.
VII. CONCLUSION

While the Kirkman decision is sound as a matter of policy in its adherence to
caveat venditor, lenders likely will be left with uncertainty as to how to determine
what constitutes substantial involvement and how to prove that a disclaimer was
specifically bargained for. Without proper guidance, attempts on the part of lenders
to disclaim implied warranty liability likely will be the source of much litigation.
Accordingly, in an effort to maintain the protection of buyers from latent defects,
the enactment of legislation allowing lenders or developers the option to acquire
insurance in lieu of a disclaimer will avoid the uncertainty arising from the Kirkman
decision and decrease potential litigation costs for both lenders and buyers.
MargaretN. Fox

185. For example, it may be that a lender has confidence in a specific developer and chances
litigation costs in lieu of definite insurance costs. Alternatively, where a lender has less certainty in a
developer's skill it may decide to acquire additional insurance.
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